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PARTIES IN THE COURT BELOW 
The caption lists all parties to the proceedings below. 
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APPELLANTS REPLY ARGUMENT 
As outlined below, the positions taken in Defendant ORR Enterprise's Appellee 
Brief are untenable, unsupported in law or by the record. Based on the briefs, the need 
for reversal and remand shows itself unequivocally. 
Defendant attempts to expand the appellate review requested by 
Plaintiff/Appellant Home Abstract beyond the narrow legal issue raised in the appellant's 
opening brief. Plaintiff Home Abstract is asking the Court to decide, as a matter of law, 
whether Plaintiff Home Abstract acquired the original plaintiffs standing to sue, by virtue 
of a Rule 25 substitution. 
Defendant, in its Appellee Brief, attempts to focus the Court's attention on a 
different issue; the issue of whether the original plaintiff himself had standing to pursue 
his quiet title claims. This separate issue was never seriously addressed by any of the 
pleadings or proceedings on file in the matter below, and is wholly unsupported by the 
record. It is important to note that Defendant never seriously challenged the original 
plaintiffs standing to pursue his quiet title claims during the two-and-a-half years that the 
original plaintiff prosecuted this lawsuit on his own, and never contested the substitution 
of Plaintiff Home Abstract in October of 2006. Furthermore, Defendant never raised the 
issue of the original plaintiffs standing, or lack thereof, in its Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment or during its oral argument on said Motion before the District Court. In fact, 
for purposes of Plaintiff Home Abstract's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Defendants1 Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, it was assumed that the original 
plaintiff did, in fact, have standing to sue. The fact that Defendant did not include a 
644 76242v1 
single record citation in support of its claim that its motion below was based on the 
original plaintiffs lack of standing, is indicative of the utter lack of record support for 
Defendant's new contention. 
Since the issue of whether the original plaintiff had standing to sue was never 
addressed below, Plaintiff has not had the opportunity to present evidence or arguments 
on this point, and the District Court has not been able to directly evaluate and address this 
question. Furthermore, since the record is devoid of any discussion of the issue, this 
Court should refrain from deciding this question and should assume, for purposes of 
appeal, that the original plaintiff had standing to sue. The Court should focus its review 
on the issue of whether a substitute plaintiff substituted pursuant to Rule 25(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, acquires the original plaintiffs standing to sue. If the 
Court answers this question in the affirmative, this case can be remanded to the District 
Court so that the issue of the original plaintiffs standing, or lack thereof, can be 
appropriately addressed. 
Defendant's Appellee Brief also fails to adequately address the following central 
and fully supported points of Home Abstract's well-taken appeal: 
• Courts have held that when there is no objection from the non-substituting 
party to the granting of a motion for substitution, the non-substituting party 
is barred from later objecting to the substitution. Aplt. Br. at 9-10. 
• Once a substitution has occurred, the substitute party steps into the 
procedural position of the original party. Aplt. Br. at 10-11. 
• Once a substitution has occurred, procedural characteristics such as 
standing are transferred, by virtue of the Rule 25(c) substitution, from the 
original plaintiff to the substitute plaintiff despite deficiencies that would 
ordinarily prevent the substitute plaintiff from carrying on the original 
plaintiffs claims. Aplt. Br. at 11-12. 
As a result, the Court should overturn the District Court's decision holding that 
Plaintiff lacked standing to pursue a quiet title action against the subject property and, if 
necessary, remand this matter to the District Court for additional proceedings. 
L DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE ORIGINAL PLAINTIFF LACKED 
STANDING TO SUE WAS NEVER SERIOUSLY ADDRESSED BELOW. 
THEREFORE, FOR PURPOSES OF THIS APPEAL, IT SHOULD BE 
ASSUMED THAT THE ORIGINAL PLAINTIFF DID HAVE STANDING 
TO SUE. 
It is axiomatic that issues not raised before the trial court are waived and cannot 
properly be considered by an appellate court. State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 114, |^ 13, 61 
P.3d 1062, 1066; see also Cunningham v. Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549, 550 n.2 (Utah 
1984) (reversed on other grounds) (noting that when the record on appeal contains no 
indication that a certain issue was reached or addressed by the trial court, the appellate 
court cannot consider that issue). 
In this matter, Defendant's primary argument in opposition to Plaintiff Home 
Abstract's appeal is that the original plaintiff, Corey Vandenberg, lacked standing to sue. 
Aplee. Br. at 12-20. This argument, however, was never seriously addressed below by 
the parties or the District Court. In fact, for two-and-a-half years prior to the substitution 
of Home Abstract for Vandenberg in October of 2006, Vandenberg pursued his quiet title 
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claims and never had his standing to sue seriously challenged. For example, in or about 
April of 2006, Defendant filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The premise of 
this Motion was that Vandenberg and Defendant both had property interests in the subject 
property, but that Defendant's interest was superior to Vandenberg's interest because 
Defendant was a bona fide purchaser of the subject property. [R. 74-84]. The District 
Court denied Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on this issue because it 
determined that there were material factual disputes that precluded summary judgment. 
[R. 269-70]. 
On October 24, 2006, Plaintiff Home Abstract was substituted into the position of 
the original plaintiff by an Order of Substitution made pursuant to Rule 25(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. [R. 312-13]. Defendant did not oppose this substitution; and in 
fact, signed a stipulation consenting to the substitution. [R. 293-94]. 
Furthermore, Defendant never raised the issue of the original plaintiffs standing in 
its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment or during its oral argument on said Motion 
before the District Court. In fact, for purposes of Plaintiff Home Abstract's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, it was 
assumed that the original plaintiff did, in fact, have standing to sue. This assumption is 
evidenced by the fact that all of the discussion during oral argument focused on "Home 
Defendants did assert, as an affirmative defense, that Vandenberg lacked standing to 
pursue his claims. [R. 23-8; 316-28]. There does not appear, however, to have been any 
attempt made by Defendants to actively assert this affirmative defense before the District 
Court. 
Abstract" and not "Corey Vandenberg," and appears to have been expressly 
acknowledged by Defendant's counsel during oral argument. [R. 608]; [Tr. 24-5; 32]. 
As outlined above, the issue of whether the original plaintiff had standing to sue 
was never seriously raised before the District Court; and therefore, the parties have never 
had the opportunity to present evidence or arguments on this issue, and the District Court 
was not able to evaluate or address this question. As a result, it would be inappropriate 
for this Court to determine, on appeal, whether the original plaintiff had standing to 
initiate the quiet title action that is the subject of this action. 
Rather than focus on this extra-record issue, the Court should focus its 
determination on whether, as a matter of law, a substitute plaintiff, substituted pursuant to 
Rule 25(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, acquires the original plaintiffs standing 
to sue. To make this determination, the Court need not resolve the question of whether 
the original plaintiff in this matter had standing to sue and can assume, as the District 
Court appeared to, that the original plaintiff did have standing to sue. The Court can then 
remand this case to the District Court so that the issue of the original plaintiffs standing, 
or lack thereof, can be appropriately addressed. 
For the record, Plaintiff Home Abstract does contend that the original plaintiff had 
standing to sue. The original plaintiff claimed title to the subject property by virtue of 
two deeds (i) a November 29, 2003 Quit Claim Deed from Raymond and Valerie 
Vanderdoes to Wheelock Holdings, L.L.C, a Utah limited liability company solely owned 
and managed by the original plaintiff; and (ii) a March 25, 2004 Warranty Deed from 
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Raymond and Valerie Vanderdoes. [R. 1-8. 497-503, 431-320].2 The original plaintiff 
also argued, and Plaintiff Home Abstract similarly contends, that the original plaintiffs 
ownership interest in the subject property is prior and superior to Defendant's claimed 
interest. These are factual issues that will need to be addressed by the District Court on 
remand. 
IL DEFENDANTS FAILURE TO OBJECT TO PLAINTIFF HOME 
ABSTRACTS SUBSTITUTION INTO THE POSITION OF THE 
ORIGINAL PLAINTIFF AT THE TIME OF SUBSTITUTION BARS 
IT FROM NOW OBJECTING TO THE SUBSTITUTION. 
At least one court that has addressed Rule 25 substitutions held that when there is 
no objection from the non-substituting party to the granting of a motion for substitution, 
the non-substituting party is barred from later objecting to the substitution. See Investors 
Mortgage Co. v. Rhodia, 31 Conn. App. 476. 481 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993). This holding is 
significant in this matter because it appears that Defendant, by belatedly raising the issue 
of the original plaintiffs standing, is in effect attempting to object to Plaintiff Home 
Abstract's substitution. 
Plaintiff Home Abstract was substituted into the position of the original plaintiff 
by an Order of the District Court on or about November 6, 2006. fR. 312-13]. Defendant 
did not oppose this substitution; and in fact, signed a stipulation consenting to the 
2
 For the record, Plaintiff Home Abstract also objects to the comments made by Judge 
Jones during oral argument in which he stated: 'There's no question that a trust was 
created. There's no question the property was put in the trust. There's no question the 
trust merged at some point." [Tr. 34]. These comments appear to contradict his earlier 
statements that "there is a real dispute of facts" as to the issue of trust formation. [Tr. 
33]. The factual issues surrounding the Vanderdoes Trust, like those related to the 
original plaintiffs standing to sue, involve issues of fact that the District Court needs to 
properly address on remand. 
substitution. [R. 293-94]. If Defendant objects to the original plaintiffs standing to sue, 
or to Plaintiff Home Abstract's standing as substitute plaintiff, it should have objected to 
the substitution at the time that the substitution was contemplated and effectuated. 
Defendant failed to do so, and should now be barred from objecting to Plaintiff Home 
Abstract's substitution or the legal effect that flows from that substitution. 
HI. ONCE A RULE 25 SUBSTITUTION HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, 
PROCEDURAL CHARACTERISTICS, SUCH AS STANDING, ARE 
TRANSFERRED FROM THE ORIGINAL PLAINTIFF TO THE 
SUBSTITUTE PLAINTIFF, DESPITE DEFICIENCIES THAT WOULD 
ORDINARILY PREVENT THE SUBSTITUTE PLAINTIFF FROM 
ASSERTING THE ORIGINAL PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS. 
It is clear that the purpose of substitutions, made pursuant to Rule 25 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure (and the identical provisions of Rule 25 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure), is to transfer the procedural characteristics of the original plaintiff to 
the substitute plaintiff in order to allow the substitute plaintiff to carry on the original 
plaintiffs claims, without disrupting normal business transactions during the pendency of 
litigation or unnecessarily extending litigation. The United States Supreme Court made 
reference to this purpose in Freeport-McMoran, Inc. v .KN Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426 
(1991), when it justified the extension of diversity jurisdiction to a clearly non-diverse 
substitute party. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 498 U.S. at 428. 
This underlying purpose is on display in a variety of substitution cases where the 
courts allowed the substitute plaintiff to acquire the original party's procedural 
characteristics (or "step into the shoes" of the original party) and carry on the original 
party's claims, despite procedural deficiencies that would ordinarily bar the substitute 
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plaintiff from participating in the litigation. For example, the United States Supreme 
Court allowed a non-diverse substitute party to carry on with a federal lawsuit premised 
upon diversity jurisdiction because the substitute plaintiff had acquired, by virtue of 
substitution, the plaintiffs diversity. See Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 498 U.S. at 428. The 
First Circuit Court of Appeals extended personal jurisdiction to a substitute defendant 
who clearly lacked contacts with the forum state because the substitute defendant had 
stepped into the shoes of the original defendant, and the original defendant's contacts 
were imputed to the substitute plaintiff. See Explosives Corp. of Am. v. Garlam Enters. 
Corp., 817 F.2d 894, 906 (1st Cir. 1987). Similarly, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that the substitution of one party for another would not disrupt the venue of an 
ongoing federal lawsuit, because the court would essentially ignore the substitution and 
allow the matter to proceed as if the substitution had never occurred. See Minnesota 
Mining Co. v. ECO Chem., Inc., 757 F.2d 1256. 1262 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
Defendant apparently objects to the underlying purpose of substitutions by arguing 
that the substitute plaintiff must be independently qualified to carry on the original party's 
claims. Apllee. Br. at 21. For example, Defendant argues that the substitution of one 
party into the position of another should not overcome the general rule requiring transfers 
of property to be in writing. Apllee Br. at 21. Surely the non-substituted parties in the 
cases referenced above similarly argued that substitution should not be allowed to 
overcome the federal statutes governing diversity jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, or 
venue. Despite those arguments; however, the courts above decided that substitution 
could overcome contrary statutory provisions and held that substituted parties could step 
into the shoes of the original party, despite deficiencies that would normally prevent them 
from asserting the original plaintiffs claims. 
The situation is substantially similar to the cases cited above. Plaintiff Home 
Abstract, by virtue of the Rule 25 substitution, stepped into the original plaintiffs 
position, and should be allowed to carry on the original plaintiffs claims, despite the 
alleged deficiencies that would normally prevent Plaintiff Home Abstract from 
asserting the original plaintiffs quiet title claims. The substitution, in effect, should 
allow Plaintiff Home Abstract to carry on the lawsuit filed by the original plaintiff, as if 
no change in the parties had occurred. 
Defendant argues that the Utah Courts should reject the underlying purpose of 
substitutions in quiet title cases because this rule would do nothing to protect quiet title 
defendants from the claims of third-parties who claim an interest in the subject property 
by virtue of a transfer from the original plaintiff. Aplee Br. at 24. This complication; 
however, is not realistic, and has already been addressed by the substitution process laid 
out in Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Before a party can be substituted 
pursuant to Rule 25, the original party must move the Court for a substitution and/or 
receive the consent of the non-substituting party. Thus, the Court and the non-
For the record, Plaintiff Home Abstract does claim an interest in the subject property 
separate from the original plaintiff, Corey Vandenberg, by virtue of a June 2007 Quit 
Claim Deed from Vandenberg Investments & Properties, L.L.C., a limited liability 
company formally known as Wheelock Holdings, L.L.C. Wheelock Holdings, L.L.C 
received deed to the subject property from the Vanderdoeses on November 29, 2003. 
Wheelock's interest was subsequently assigned to Vandenberg Investments & Properties, 
L.L.C. This June 2007 Quit Claim Deed was attached to Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavits ([R. 556-563]) and was discussed 
during oral argument ([Tr. 12-13; 23-4; 28-9]). 
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substituting party can. at the time of substitution, evaluate whether the substituting party 
is sufficiently qualified to step into the shoes of the original party. This process protects 
a quiet title defendant from becoming subject to the claims of unidentified third parties 
who claim an interest in the defendant's property. Once that substitution is accomplished; 
however, the substituted party should be allowed to carry the original party's claims 
forward. 
In this case, the substitution was properly carried out pursuant to Rule 25 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The original party, Corey Vandenberg, apparently 
consulted with Defendant about the contemplated substitution, and Defendant signed a 
stipulation consenting to that substitution. [R. 293-94]. The signed stipulation was then 
presented to the District Court and an Order of Substitution was signed and entered by 
the District Court. [R. 312-13]. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons. Appellant respectfully requests that this Court overturn 
the District Court's decision holding that Plaintiff lacked standing to pursue a quiet title 
action against the subject property and, if necessary, remand this matter to the District 
Court for additional proceedings. 
DATED this L ^ day of April, 2008. 
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Attorney for Appellant 
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